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Motivation and Constitutionality: A
Postscript
LAWRENCE A. ALEXANDER*
The editors of the San Diego Law Review have been kind
enough to allow me to add briefly to my prior remarks on motiva-
tion and constitutionality.'
First, I wish to amend my comments on Larry Simon's method
for determining the motivation of collective bodies.2 Simon took
the position that, for the purpose of determining motivation, col-
lective bodies should be treated as if they were individuals.3
Thus, if the probability of illicit motivation raised by the circum-
stances is one-third where the action in question is that of a one-
member school board, the probability of illicit motivation of a five-
member school board should also be one-third if the circum-
stances surrounding the action are the same. In neither case
should the action be deemed invalid because of illicit motivation.
I raised a problem for Simon's method presented by a five-
member school board's taking an action after a three-to-two vote.
Suppose the probability of illicit motivation behind the action is
one-third if the school board consists of but one person. Simon
says to uphold the action. But if a one-third probability means
one of the three "Ayes" probably had the illicit motivation, the ac-
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tion would not have received majority approval "but for" an illic-
itly motivated vote.
I went on to suggest that Simon might handle the problem I had
raised by attributing the reciprocal probability of illicit motivation
to the "Nays." Thus, if there were a one-third probability of illicit
motivation among the "Ayes," there would be a two-thirds
probability of illicit motivation among the "Nays," tainting one
and one-third of the two "Nay" votes.
What I failed to say, and what was quickly pointed out to me by
an observant colleague, 4 is that the technique I had suggested for
avoiding the problem I had raised works only in those very rare
cases where a certain probability of illicit motivation among
"Ayes" in fact suggests the reciprocal probability of illicit motiva-
tion among "Nays." Most of the time the probability of illicit mo-
tive (say, racial prejudice) in voting for something (say,
neighborhood schools) does not suggest the reciprocal probability
of illicit motive in voting against it. So the problem I raised for
Simon remains.
The second item I wish to address is a problem that the propo-
nent of any motive theory faces if he accepts two premises which
are widely accepted among constitutional lawyers. Premise one is
that a law may in fact be unconstitutional even though a review-
ing court, for institutional reasons, would not declare it so. Prem-
ise two is that a legislator has a constitutional obligation to
oppose any law which is in fact unconstitutional, including laws
which come under Premise one and would be upheld in the
courts. 5
When these two premises are joined with the motive theorist's
Premise three-that laws which are the product of certain mo-
tives are in fact unconstitutional-they produce a conclusion that
will seem highly counter-intuitive to many: a legislator who be-
lieves a law is wise, just, and perhaps essential for the public wel-
fare, and who is motivated to vote for it because of those beliefs,
nevertheless has a constitutional obligation to vote against it if he
knows that a critical number of his colleagues are voting for it for
improper reasons. Only if the term "unconstitutional" carries a
meaning in Premise two that is more restrictive than its meaning
in Premise three can this conclusion be avoided.
Perhaps this paradoxical conclusion is no different from and no
more embarrassing than other conclusions about principled deci-
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sionmaking by collective bodies.6 It surely has its analogues.
Consider the obligation of the juror who believes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a heinous crime, but
who also knows that his fellow jurors believe the defendant to be
innocent but plan to vote "guilty" out of prejudice. Yet, analogues
or not, I see the problem as one with which the motive theorist
must somehow deal.
The third and final matter I wish to mention should have been
included in a footnote to my discussion of legislative mistake as a
basis of unconstitutionality. What I want to say is that some form
of the theory which deems legislative mistakes to be pivotal has
been popular as an alternative to either effects theories or theo-
ries about proscribed motives because a legislative mistakes the-
ory appears to avoid the value choices inherent in theories about
proscribed motives or effects. In the post-Lochner7 era of aver-
sion to value-laden jurisprudence, the allure of an objective,
value-free test of constitutionality has been strong. From Tuss-
man and tenBroek8 to Gunther9 to the Supreme Court in Wein-
berger v. WiesenfeldlO and Trimble v. Gordon," value-free
legislative mistakes analysis has had and continues to have pow-
erful champions, at least under the equal protection clause.
A value-free legislative mistakes theory of equal protection is
based upon determining whether the legislative means-the
law-serves or "fits" sufficiently the legislative objectives in en-
acting the law. If the fit is too imperfect, the legislature has made
a means/ends mistake, a violation of equal protection.
The Achilles' heel of any such theory lies in specifying the leg-
islative objectives against which the law is measured. Tussman
and tenBroek provide no test for what are permissible objectives
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and at what level of generality those objectives should be de-
scribed in order to determine means/ends fit.12 If any objective or
objectives, described as specifically as one wants, are permissible,
each law tautologically "fits" with the precise "objectives" its
terms mandate.13
Gunther would measure legislative means against officially
promulgated objectives.14 However, with no constitutional limita-
tions on the promulgated objectives, in terms of either permissi-
bility or level of generality, his test merely becomes one of official
ingenuity in formulating objectives. Ironically, a legislature which
articulates sufficiently malign objectives behind a mischievous
statute will have proved "fit"-the absence of mistake: neither
bad effects nor bad motives produce unconstitutional laws so long
as they accompany each other.' 5
The Supreme Court's approach in Weinberger, Trimble, and
other cases is to test legislative means by actual legislative objec-
tives, presumably articulated at whatever level of generality the
legislature held them. Here the game shifts from articulating bad
motives for bad laws to actually having bad motives for those
laws.16
Equal protection, as well as other constitutional norms, is not
value-free but heavily value-laden. It requires not merely that
legislative means fit legislative ends, whatever those ends may be,
but that the laws produce (effects theories), or reflect a motiva-
tion to produce (motive theories), effects consistent with a partic-
ular normative conception of human equality. Because Simon's
and Clark's proscription of legislative mistakes fits within a nor-
mative theory regarding the proper conception of human equality
required of legislators, their proscription of legislative mistakes is
12. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L.
REV. 341, 350 (1949).
13. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L. J.
123 (1972).
14. Gunther, The Supreme Cour 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1972).
15. Gunther's approach appears to treat equal protection, not as a proscription
of certain inequalities, but as a means of guaranteeing that the public really does
endorse those inequalities.
16. The Supreme Court's approach appears to treat equal protection, not as a
proscription of inequalities, but as a means of guaranteeing that the legislature
really does endorse those inequalities.
There is another possible approach which focuses not so much on whether the
legislative means fit the real legislative ends, but on whether the legislature had
sufficient evidence of such fit when it acted. This approach would emphasize the
regularity of government action, the "due process of lawmaking." See Linde, Due
Process ofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
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not subject to the criticisms directed at the value-free approaches
to mistakes.17
17. A recent article attempts to meet the criticisms of means/ends approaches
to equal protection by conceding that specifying the level of generality at which
legislative objectives must be formulated for means/ends scrutiny and determin-
ing the legitimacy of those objectives so formulated are not value-free processes.
However, because the article fails itself to identify the root normative values be-
hind the equal protection and due process clauses, its otherwise brilliant analysis
of the structure of means/ends scrutiny ultimately provides only an empty vessel,
to be filled with whatever values one chooses, and capable of rationalizing any par-
ticular decision. Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76
MIcH. L. REV. 771 (1978).

